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Abstract
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is being hailed as the latest example of a General Purpose
Technology that could transform productivity and help tackle important societal chal-
lenges. This outcome is however not guaranteed: a myopic focus on short-term benefits
could lock AI into technologies that turn out to be sub-optimal in the longer-run. For
this reason, it may be valuable to preserve diversity in the AI trajectories that are
explored until there is more information about their relative merits and dangers. Re-
cent controversies about the dominance of deep learning methods and private labs in
AI research suggest that the field may be getting narrower, but the evidence base is
lacking. We seek to address this gap with an analysis of the thematic diversity of AI
research in arXiv, a widely used pre-prints site. Having identified 110,000 AI papers in
this corpus, we use hierarchical topic modelling to estimate the thematic composition
of AI research, and this composition to calculate various metrics of research diversity.
Our analysis suggests that diversity in AI research has stagnated in recent years, and
that AI research involving private sector organisations tends to be less diverse than
research in academia. This appears to be driven by a small number of prolific and
narrowly-focused technology companies. Diversity in academia is bolstered by smaller
institutions and research groups that may have less incentives to ‘race’ and lower levels
of collaboration with the private sector. We also find that private sector AI researchers
tend to specialise in data and computationally intensive deep learning methods at
the expense of research involving other (symbolic and statistical) AI methods, and of
research that considers the societal and ethical implications of AI or applies it in do-
mains like health. Our results suggest that there may be a rationale for policy action
to prevent a premature narrowing of AI research that could reduce its societal benefits,
but we note the incentive, information and scale hurdles standing in the way of such
interventions.
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Tenembaum told me he looks to the story of backprop for inspiration. For
decades, backprop was cool math that didnt really accomplish anything. As
computers got faster and the engineering got more sophisticated, suddenly it
did. He hopes the same thing might happen with his own work and that of his
students, “but it might take another couple decades”.
Interview with AI researcher Joshua Tenembaum in Somers [2017]
1 Introduction
Technological change has a direction as well as a rate: different designs for a technology
are possible, and some of them may be more societally desirable than others [Aghion et al.,
2009]. Fortuitous events, shortsightedness and lack of coordination can however create
situations where an inferior design becomes dominant and hard to switch away from even
after its limitations become apparent [David, 1985, Arthur, 1994]. Consider for example
the automobile, where the combustion engine surpassed environmentally friendlier alterna-
tives based on steam or electricity, or the case of the nuclear reactor, where early demand
from the military locked this technology into a light water design that was less suitable
for civilian applications [Cowan, 1990]. Faced with uncertainty about the benefits and
risks of alternative technologies and the desire to avoid premature lock-in to an inferior de-
sign, it might be reasonable to put in place policies to preserve diversity in the technology
landscape [Aghion et al., 2009]. In military procurement, funders have long adopted port-
folio strategies to explore multiple technologies in parallel [Johnson, 2012]. Contemporary
approaches to mission-oriented innovation policy call for bottom-up exploration of tech-
nological opportunities that avoid picking a single solution for tackling complex societal
challenges [Mazzucato, 2018].
Are similar initiatives needed to sustain technological diversity in Artificial Intelligence
(AI) research? AI systems based on deep learning, a machine learning technique that infers
patterns from large unstructured datasets have been deployed successfully in many digital
and media products and services [LeCun et al., 2015]. AI’s technical and commercial
successes have attracted large R&D investments from corporations and venture capitalists
and the attention of economists and policymakers who have respectively heralded AI as
the latest example of a General Purpose Technology (GPT) with revolutionary potential
[Cockburn et al., 2018] and launched national strategies and plans to bolster indigenous
AI industries and mitigate the disruption caused by labour-displacing AI systems [Paunov
et al., 2019].
Others have highlighted the limitations of this AI trajectory. Some researchers note
that AI systems based on deep learning are brittle and liable to fail in unexpected and
catastrophic ways when they are exposed to new situations or gamed by malicious actors,
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potentially making them unsuitable for high stake domains such as transport or health
[Marcus, 2018, Russell, 2019]. Economists worry that businesses may deploy ‘mediocre’
AI systems that fail to offset their labour displacement effects with productivity gains
[Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2019]. Activists, journalists and critical scholars of technology
have found that some AI systems generate discriminatory and unfair outcomes [Lum and
Isaac, 2016] and/or enable mass surveillance by governments and commercial actors [Zuboff,
2019] . There is increasing evidence that data-hungry, computationally intensive deep
learning systems may be environmentally unsustainable [Thompson et al., 2020].
The terms of the debate echo a three-step process often described in the directed
technical change literature: a powerful yet in some ways flawed technological design gains
momentum among researchers, entrepreneurs, investors and policymakers (step 1), reduc-
ing the diversity of ideas that are explored and creating the risk of lock-in (step 2) that
may be regretted in the future, when the full costs of the dominant design become manifest
(step 3). In this paper we study the first two steps of this process in the context of AI
research: we analyse the evolution of its thematic and organisational composition and how
this is reflected in the diversity of ideas that are pursued by AI researchers, paying particu-
lar attention to the activities of private sector organisations that have become increasingly
influential in the AI research landscape [Hain et al., 2020, Ahmed and Wahed, 2020] and
which, according to the literature, may play an important role in narrowing its diversity
by concentrating on those designs with the shortest-term commercial potential regardless
of their longer term impacts and externalities [Bryan and Lemus, 2017].1
To do this, we analyse the corpus of AI research in arXiv, a pre-prints repository
widely used by the AI research and development community. We estimate the thematic
composition of this corpus with a topic model and use this information to calculate its
thematic diversity according to various metrics. We study the evolution of these metrics
and compare the diversity of AI research involving private firms with the rest of the corpus.
Our results suggest that thematic diversity in AI research has stagnated and even de-
clined in recent years, and that private sector organisations (in particular large technology
companies) are more narrowly focused on frontier, computationally demanding deep learn-
ing technologies than organisations in academia and the public sector. Our results suggest
that there may be a policy rationale to preserve diversity in AI research. The metrics that
we develop could help inform this agenda.
After highlighting our contributions in the rest of this section, in Section 2 we re-
view the literature on directed technological change and its implications for research and
technological diversity. We also outline the history of AI, and point at some parallelisms
between recent trends and dynamics identified in the literature. In Section 3 we describe
1Throughout the paper we will use the term thematic diversity to refer to the topics covered in our
corpus - they mostly comprise research and technological subjects so our usage of the term is closely related
to notions of research and technological diversity.
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our research questions, data and methods and in Section 4 we present our findings. Section
5 concludes with a discussion of our results, their limitations, issues for further research
and policy implications.
1.1 Contribution
Our analysis contributes to a growing body of AI mapping that is starting to consider the
constituent elements of AI’s technological trajectory in terms of the specific technologies
and methods that are developed, the actors involved in research, its application sectors
and connections with other disciplines [Klinger et al., 2018, Cockburn et al., 2018, Frank
et al., 2019, Stathoulopoulos and Mateos-Garcia, 2019]. We advance this literature by
generating, to the best of our knowledge, the first set of aggregate measures of thematic
diversity in a large corpus of AI research, and studying its links with increasing participation
by private sector firms (Freire et al. [2020] also measures AI diversity but focusing on a
small number of submissions to AI conferences, and ignoring thematic aspects of diversity.).
This grounds our analysis in the directed technological change literature, and increases its
policy relevance.
Our results are consistent with theories of directed technological change that study
the processes and factors through which technology designs attain dominance [Arthur,
1994, Bryan and Lemus, 2017]. This literature has for the most part relied on qualitative
data, historical case studies and simulations, to which we contribute with our quantitative
analysis. We also contribute to the AI safety literature, which has previously highlighted
the safety risks created by research and innovation races where institutions or countries
seek to develop powerful AI systems ahead of their competitors [Armstrong et al., 2016].
This literature has generally focused on the longer-term consequences of these races, such
as the risk of developing AI systems that are misaligned with human values and preferences.
Here we provide evidence of how racing behaviours taking place now may be narrowing AI
research in a way that could lead to the development of inferior and unsafe AI systems. In
doing this, we respond to recent calls for studies that bridge the gap between short term
and long term perspectives in AI governance research [Dafoe, 2017].
Methodologically, we build on a growing literature that applies Natural Language Pro-
cessing (NLP) methods to the analysis of the composition, diversity and interdisciplinarity
of research and technological fields [Suominen, 2017, Paez-Aviles et al., 2018]. Top-SBM,
the algorithm we use in our analysis, presents important advantages over the Latent Dirich-
let Allocation algorithm which is standard in this literature.
The novel dataset that we have created for this paper will be made available, together
will all our code at https://github.com/nestauk/ai diversity research.
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2 Literature Review
2.1 Directed technological change
Following Arthur, we define a technology as ‘a means to fulfil a human purpose’ and ‘an
assemblage of practices and components’ [Arthur, 2009].2 The notion of directed techno-
logical change reflects the fact that there are generally many different components and
assemblages of components (which we will refer to as ‘technological designs’) that could
be feasibly deployed to build a technology that fulfils a human purpose: for example, an
automobile that fulfils the human purpose of individual transportation can be based on
a combustion engine design, a steam-powered design or an electricity-powered design. As
we will see below, an AI system that imitates intellectual faculties could be based on a
collection of conditional statements that govern its behaviour (symbolic design), or on an
algorithm that has ‘learned’ which actions are more conducive to a successful outcome
after being trained on a labelled dataset (supervised machine learning design), exploring
a synthetic environment (reinforcement learning design) or observing the behaviour of a
human agent (inverse reinforcement learning design).
One important implication of directed technological change is that the evolution of
technologies is rarely if ever a deterministic process: given a set of technological designs T
= {t1, t2, ..., tn} that could fulfil a human purpose, and a set of contexts C = {c1, c2, ..., cm}
where those designs could be deployed, there is not a design tjT such that its performance
P in context ck Pck(tj) > Pck(ti) ∀tiT, ckC. If such design existed, then it would always be
adopted regardless of the context and it would be unnecessary to consider its alternatives.
The design would be equivalent to the technology, and its direction would be singular. If to
the contrary the relative performance of a technological design depends on its context, then
this means that multiple technological designs are in principle possible, and the direction
of a technology matters.
Technology designs evolve following technological trajectories shaped by incremen-
tal and radical improvements in their constituent components, changes in the supply of
complementary inputs such as natural resources, skills and other technologies, as well as
economic, social and cultural factors [Dosi, 1982].
Many of the factors that shape the process of technological development and deploy-
ment are endogenous to it, generating feedback loops that have received particular attention
in the complexity and evolutionary economics literatures. For example, if the performance
of a technological design improves with its levels of adoption (say because this increases the
supply of complementary resources such as workers with the skills to develop or operate
the design, or because there are economies of scale in its production or network effects
2Arthur provides a third definition (‘the entire collection of engineering practices and devices available
to a culture’ ) but this refers to technology as a field rather than the specific technologies that constitute it.
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in its consumption), then a technological design that gains an early advantage against its
competitors may be difficult to dislodge even by alternatives that would be superior to
it if they had the same level of adoption Arthur [1994]. A paradigmatic example of such
path-dependence is the QWERTY keyboard, a system designed with the goal of avoiding
jams in mechanical typewriters that survived the advent of digital computers because of
the abundant supply of typists trained to use it [David, 1985].
Two important implications of this model are that random events early in the trajec-
tory of a technology can create lock-in to a design irrespective of its merits compared to
the alternatives, and that such situations can lead to a ‘winner-takes-all’ result where a
single design dominates the technology landscape. Once such as dominant design emerges,
the focus of competition moves from product innovation to process innovation that favours
larger organizations able to reap economies of scale in the deployment of the design [Sua´rez
and Utterback, 1995]. This technological homogenisation is allied with processes of ‘insti-
tutional isomorphism’ where coercive, mimetic and normative factors lead organisations
in a sector tend to adopt similar processes and organisational structures [DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983] and production routines [Nelson, 2009].
The economics of science, technology and innovation literature has also studied di-
rected technological change and technological diversity. Acemoglu [2011] models the be-
haviour of researchers that choose between developing a dominant technology or preserving
a second-tier alternative. He shows that these researchers have incentives to contribute to
the dominant technology, creating a technological ecosystem that is vulnerable to changes
in circumstances - e.g. in tastes or relative prices - that suddenly render the second-tier
technology more desirable but insufficiently developed for effective deployment. Accord-
ing to this model, one potential avenue to preserve technological diversity is to promote
an inclusive research workforce that has a divergent expectations and preferences about
available technological options. Hopenhayn and Squintani [2016] show that competitive
allocations of R&D resources creates a social dilemma with over-investment and canni-
balisation of efforts in those areas that are perceived to be high return and insufficient
exploration of other areas where problems remain unsolved. Bryan and Lemus [2017] con-
sider a scenario with sequential research where discoveries build on each other. In this
model, the laissez-faire outcome is directionally inefficient because firms race in pursuit of
those research lines that are most beneficial in the short-term at the expense of alternatives
with larger long-term benefits. Horizontal policies that subsidise innovation without tak-
ing into account the relative merits of different research lines strengthen the incentives for
racing, further distorting the direction of innovation. Building on this model, Bryan et al.
[2020] present evidence that many small and inexperienced firms have rushed to re-purpose
drugs against Covid-19 in a race that may discourage other firms from developing costly
and harder-to-produce vaccines with higher benefits.
Going beyond technological and economic factors, scholars in management, sociology
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and cultural studies have documented the contingency of technological development and
the role of social and political forces in its construction. This includes studies of how
technological trajectories are shaped by the emergence of standards and benchmarks that
influence perceptions of quality early in the history of a technology [Karnøe and Garud,
2012], the interests and preferences of communities of innovators and lead users (notably
including the military [Kaldor, 1982]), and political and ideological factors as different
social groups seek to influence technology development and adoption to assert their power
and protect their privileges [Winner, 1980].
2.2 Rationales for preserving technological diversity
Our discussion so far suggests that technological development will not necessarily evolve in
the most societally desirable direction. To the contrary, random events and misalignment
between private and public interest (specially in the presence of shortsightedness and rac-
ing) coupled with increasing returns to scale and network effects mean that this outcome
may well be the exception rather than the rule.
This creates a dual role for technology policy: to prevent lock-in to inferior technologi-
cal designs and, if possible, steer technological development towards superior technological
designs [Aghion et al., 2009]. Unfortunately, there are significant informational challenges
standing in the way of such policy decisions, specially in the early stages of the develop-
ment of a technology when there is a high degree of uncertainty about its benefits, risks and
distributional aspects [Rotolo et al., 2015]. Given this, one promising strategy would be
to preserve diversity in the technology landscape, avoiding ‘excess momentum‘ that could
result in the premature lock-in of a particular design until there is a fuller understanding
of its implications by all stakeholders. Maintaining second-tier technologies in order to re-
duce vulnerability to ‘surprises’ [Acemoglu, 2011], increasing the diversity of researcher and
innovator populations and providing incentives for investment in long-term research lines
counter-balancing myopic innovation races can also help maintain technological diversity
in the face of homogenising tendencies [Bryan and Lemus, 2017].
There are other rationales for preserving technological diversity beyond this portfolio
management logic. First, some technologies may need to be deployed in a wide range of
circumstances (the set C could be large and quite heterogeneous in its interactions with
elements of the set of technology designs T ), making it necessary to maintain multiple
versions of the technology being developed in parallel so as to avoid excluding specific user
groups and communities from its benefits (it is worth noting that large markets that ag-
gregate the demand of such user groups and communities may provide sufficient incentives
for the preservation of labour in a manifestation of Adam Smith’s dictum that the division
of labour - a manifestation of economic diversity - is limited by the extent of the market).
Second and related to this, technological diversity could have a political component: if spe-
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cific technology designs are aligned with particular political values, then this would create
a rationale for preserving technological diversity in the interest of political pluralism (i.e.
to avoid a situation where technology supply skews the political process in favour of those
values that are most aligned with available technologies). Current agendas of ‘technological
sovereignty‘ aimed at empowering local communities to develop digital technologies suited
to their needs and values instead of relying on commercial products and services illustrate
this idea [Lynch, 2020].
Third and last, there is an innovation rationale for technological diversity: more diver-
sity increases the range of technological components that can be drawn on for combinatorial
innovations that bolster existing technological designs or provide the foundation for new
ones [Arthur, 2009, Yaqub, 2018].
2.3 Directionality in AI research
Having reviewed the literature on directed technological change and its links with tech-
nological diversity, we turn our attention to our empirical setting, the field of AI, with a
particular focus on events and trends in the field that mirror processes described in the
literature (see table 1 for a summary of those parallelisms).
Eras of AI research: Russell and Norvig [2009] define AI as the scientific discipline and
technological practice that specialises in ‘the designing and building of intelligent agents
that receive percepts from the environment and take actions that affect that environment’.
This broad definition encompasses efforts to build general-purpose ‘machines that think’ as
well as AI systems that perform narrow classification, prediction or optimisation tasks (until
now, most progress has been in the area of narrow AI). Advances in AI could transform
how organisations process and use information, enable the automation of many cognitive
tasks and augment the skills and intelligence of human workers [Markoff, 2016]. This
explains strong commercial and government interest in AI since its beginning as a scientific
discipline in the aftermath of World War II [Wooldridge, 2020].
AI researchers and technologists have explored many designs to build AI systems.
In the 1950s they used symbolic methods to implement logical behaviours in computers,
and in the 1980s they created Expert Systems embedding the knowledge and heuristics
of human experts. In both cases, initial interest and investment in AI were followed by
disappointing results, leading to so-called AI Winters where funding dried out.
Machine learning strategies proved more scalable. Instead of looking for pre-defined
patterns in the data, machine learning algorithms are trained to induce patterns from
labelled datasets. The 2010s in particular saw important advances in deep learning [LeCun
et al., 2015], a machine learning technique loosely inspired by the operation of the human
brain where artificial neurons learn abstract patterns from large, unstructured datasets
7
Directed technology change dynamic AI trend
Many alternative technology designs are pos-
sible
Various technology designs explored in differ-
ent eras of AI research
Technology lock-in not fully based on merit Complementor lotteries and bandwagons
Institutional isomorphism Increasing overlaps between academic re-
search and industry
Short-termism Commercial and geo-political AI races
Concerns about premature lock-in to flawed
technology
Lead-user bias in the AI systems being devel-
oped and calls for exploration of alternatives
Table 1: Dynamics in the directed technological change literature and related trends in
contemporary AI research
using backpropagation, an algorithm that adjusts the strength of the links between neurons
in the network to minimise prediction error [Chauvin and Rumelhart, 1995].
In 2012, AlexNet, a deep learning system won the ImageNet image classification com-
petition, kick-starting the most recent ‘AI boom’ [Krizhevsky et al., 2012]. Since then, deep
learning-based AI systems have experienced rapid improvements in performance in a vari-
ety of tasks including computer vision and image and video generation, speech recognition
and synthesis, translation, question answering, robotics and game playing, and have been
successfully deployed in mainstream products and services such as search engines, social
networking sites, translation systems, digital personal assistants and self-driving vehicles
[Agrawal et al., 2018]. Technical advances have been accompanied by growing investment
and policy initiatives to support AI. According to the AI Index, a project to measure var-
ious dimensions of the AI ecosystem, global private investment in AI in 2019 amounted to
$70Bn. Funding for AI startups has been increasing at an average annual growth rate of
48% between 2010 and 2018. The OECD AI Observatory has identified over 300 policy
initiatives related to AI in sixty countries.
Complementor lotteries: The history of deep learning highlights the importance of
network effects and serendipity in AI’s technological trajectory. Many of the key ideas
underlying this AI design had been introduced in the 1950s and 1980s but it was not until
the 2010s, with the increasing availability of suitable hardware, software and data, that
these methods could be implemented at scale [Wooldridge, 2020]. One hardware innovation
in particular - Graphics Processor Units (GPUs) developed for video-games applications -
became an important enabler for deep learning techniques that benefit from parallelisation
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of tasks.
Hooker [2020] argues that the lag between the development of key research ideas about
artificial neural networks and their application in deep learning are an example of ‘hardware
lotteries’ in AI research: this refers to the fact that the adoption of an idea depends not only
on its merits but also on the availability of suitable complements: hardware and software
to implement the idea, and in the case of machine learning methods, large datasets for
training.
Institutional isomorphism: The advent of deep learning has seen a shift in the locus
of research activity from academia to the private sector. In 2016, AlphaGo, an AI system
developed by Alphabet’s AI subsidiary DeepMind defeated Go champion Lee Sedol in
a highly publicised five-match contest [Silver et al., 2016].3 Microsoft AI Researchers
were responsible for the first speech recognition system to achieve parity with humans in
2017. Word embeddings, a technique that uses the byproducts of a deep learning model to
represent text data in a multidimensional semantic space was developed by researchers at
Google [Mikolov et al., 2013]. In addition to generating new research result, private sector
firms have created the most popular open source frameworks for the implementation of
deep learning techniques - Tensor Flow (developed by Google) and PyTorch (developed by
Facebook).
Academic and industrial AI research have become increasingly intertwined in recent
years: Private labs recruit large numbers of researchers and graduates from leading aca-
demic institutions, and often collaborate with academic researchers who in many cases have
dual academic - industrial affiliations [Michael Gofmand, 2019, Hain et al., 2020]. Collab-
orating with industry is one of the main channels through which academic researchers
are able to access the data and infrastructure required for state-of-the-art deep learn-
ing research. Private sector companies also participate actively in key conferences such as
NeurIPS (Neural Information Processing Systems) or ICML (International Machine Learn-
ing Conference). In 2019, Google and Alphabet’s subsidiary DeepMind had the largest
number of accepted papers at the NeurIPS conference.4
One exception to the predominance of private firms at the cutting-edge of contem-
porary AI research is OpenAI, a not-for-profit lab with the mission of ‘ensuring that AI
benefits all of humanity’.5 One of the motives for the creation of OpenAI was a desire
to prevent a dominance of private interests over AI research, echoing concerns about mis-
alignment between private interests and public value in the directed technology literature.
Over time, OpenAI’s modus operandi has arguably converged with those of private sector
3It should be noted that this system combined reinforcement deep learning with Montecarlo tree search,
an older heuristic search technique.
4https://medium.com/@dcharrezt/neurips-2019-stats-c91346d31c8f
5https://openai.com/about/
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labs. In 2019, it received a $1Bn investment by Microsoft, primarily to secure access to
the cloud computing resources required to train large deep learning models [Hao, 2020],
and in 2020 it started to commercialise the outputs of GPT-3, a powerful text generator
it has developed.6 This illustrates the increasing importance of large scale infrastructure
and process innovation in modern AI R&D and a convergence in the values, processes and
strategies of the organisations participating in it, consistent with the idea of institutional
isomorphism in AI research [Caplan and danah boyd, 2018].
AI R&D races: AI development and deployment are frequently described as ‘winner-
takes-all’ processes: private sector companies that lead on AI will be able to dominate
their markets and expand into new ones. The countries that control the direction of AI
development will be able to assert their political systems and values [Lee, 2018]. This
narrative, influenced by the notion of an ‘intelligence explosion’ where AI systems that
reach a certain level of performance become able to self-improve, is leading to races in
AI development and deployment [Armstrong et al., 2016]. Some researchers have raised
concerns that this could result in a ‘race to the bottom’ in AI safety, and that the pressure
to achieve state-of-the-art results is creating ‘troubling trends’ in AI scholarship such as
metric-gaming, overfitting of models to benchmark datasets and lack of replicability in
research outputs [Lipton and Steinhardt, 2019].
A premature narrowing of AI research? There is increasing awareness of the lim-
itations of AI systems based on deep learning, and concerns about premature lock-in to
this design. Like other machine learning systems, Deep learning systems are brittle and
liable to fail when they confront situations outside their training set [Marcus, 2018]. Deep
learning systems greedily optimise metrics of predictive performance even when this cre-
ates undesirable outcomes such as discriminatory decisions reflecting biases in the training
data, or behaviours that go against the intentions of their users [Russell, 2019]. They
require large datasets and computational infrastructures to train that create substantial
environmental impacts [Thompson et al., 2020].
It could be argued that some of these limitations are less consequential for AI systems
deployed in ‘low stakes’ environments such as search engines or social networking sites where
data is abundant and the costs of algorithmic error are relatively low - in other words, these
AI systems are suitable for the digital platforms and services of technology companies that
are leading AI research (and are its lead users). However, these same limitations may make
deep learning based AI systems less suitable for domains such as health, public services
or transport where the impact of mistakes is more severe and the need for systems that
6https://thenextweb.com/neural/2020/09/03/openai-reveals-the-pricing-plans-for-its-api-and-it-aint-
cheap/
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generate explainable decisions is at a premium [Mateos-Garcia, 2018].7 These systems
may also generate future societal and environmental externalities that are likely to be
under-valued by private sector firms. This could ultimately reduce the economic and social
benefits of AI systems and concentrate them in a smaller number of organisations and
communities.
In response to all this, some researchers have called for the creation of a new AI
trajectory based on hybrid systems that combine deep learning techniques with methods
from other AI traditions such as symbolic logic or causal inference that have been sidelined
during the deep learning boom [Marcus, 2018, Pearl, 2018]. Others have expressed concerns
that the development of hardware solutions optimised for commercially successful deep
learning techniques may hinder the exploration of alternative, less developed ideas [Barham
and Isard, 2019, Hooker, 2020]. This illustrates how technological diversity could provide
a pool of ideas and techniques that can be redeployed in combinatorial innovations to
overcome some of the limitations of a dominant design, and also the network effects that
may reduce this diversity and hinder a renewal in AI research trajectories.
3 Research questions, data and methods
3.1 Research questions
The discussion above motivates our analysis of the evolution of AI’s technological diversity
and its links with private sector participation in AI research. More specifically, we set out
to address the following research questions:
1. How have the levels of activity and topical composition of AI research in arXiv
evolved?
2. How has the level of participation in AI research by private sector organisations
evolved?
3. Is the thematic diversity of AI research increasing or declining?
4. How does the thematic diversity of private sector organisations compare with those
in academia and the public sector?
5. In which AI research topics do private sector organisations tend to specialise?
7Having said this, misaligned and gamed AI systems in internet platforms have been blamed for political
polarisation and manipulation, and for the spread of misinformation that contribute to societal conflict and
increase health risks.
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We would expect the answers to questions 1 and 2 to reflect our summary of the history of
AI research in section 2, with fast growth in the levels of AI research since the early 2010s,
a stronger focus on topics related to deep learning and increasing participation by private
sector companies. In answering these questions we seek to confirm general perceptions
about the recent evolution of AI research with a novel and timely dataset. This will
also help validate our data, our method to identify AI research and the topic modelling
algorithm we use to estimate AI’s thematic composition.
The expected answer to question 3 is ambiguous. On the one hand, rapid growth in
AI research may have increased diversification in its methods and application domains and
attracted new entrants into the field, bolstering its thematic diversity 8. On the other
hand, the widespread adoption of a narrow set of deep learning methods may have reduced
thematic diversity in AI research.
With questions 3 and 4, we would expect private firms to have narrower research
agendas (lower levels of thematic diversity in their research portfolio), and to be more
focused on state-of-the-art deep learning technologies with high performance and strong
commercial applications. We would expect them to be less focused on techniques developed
in previous eras of AI research such as symbolic methods and statistical (non deep learning
related) machine learning. We would also expect prestigious academic institutions that
have levels of collaboration with the private sector and are particularly likely to be active
in publishing races to have thematically narrower research agendas than other academic
institutions.
The analysis that follows does not consider all the directed technological change dy-
namics that seem to be present in AI research, such as dwindling replicability of AI research
results, labour flows between academia and industry, the impact and commercial value of
AI technologies and their limitations when applied in real-world contexts compared to
other AI techniques. All of these questions deserve a fuller treatment in future research,
to which we will come back in Section 5.
3.2 Data sources
In order to address our research questions, we create a novel dataset that combines infor-
mation from arXiv, Microsoft Academic Graph (MAG) and the Global Research Identifier.
Table 2 presents the key variables in our data.
8See Balland et al. [2020] for evidence that larger environments - in this case cities - are able to host a
greater range of complex economic and technological activities
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Table Source Variable Definition
article arXiv title Article title
article arXiv Created Date when the article was created
article arXiv categories arXiv categories (scientific and technical sub-
disciplines) that the articles have been labelled
with (Can be more than one per article)
article arXiv abstract Article abstract
institution MAG institution Institutional affiliation of article authors (set)
institution GRID Institution
type
Can be Company, Education, Facility, Govern-
ment, Nonprofit, Healthcare, Other
Table 2: Summary of key variables in the data
3.2.1 arXiv
arXiv is an online pre-print repository widely used by researchers in Science, Technology,
Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) subjects to share their work before publication.9
In recent years arXiv has become an important outlet for the dissemination of AI research
results close to real time, motivating our decision to use it in this analysis.
arXiv pre-prints are not subject to peer review, potentially raising concerns about
their quality. It is however worth noting that there are some minimum quality thresholds
to publish in the platform: submissions are reviewed for relevance and new authors are
validated by others who already participate in the platform. As we show later, leading
businesses and academic institutions across the world use arXiv to share their AI research
suggesting that it is relevant for our analysis. Previous work has showed that the majority
of papers submitted to the prestigious AI conference NeurIPS are also posted in arXiv, and
found a strong correlation between the geography of deep learning research in arXiv and
peer-reviewed AI publications as well as data-oriented technology startups [Klinger et al.,
2018]. This suggests that variation in AI research in arXiv is associated with AI research in
other publication channels as well as with other technological and entrepreneurial activities
related to AI.
One potential advantage of using arXiv over peer-reviewed publications is that it may
contain more publications by companies who want to disseminate findings rapidly ahead
of conferences or product launches, but are less driven by the desire / incentives to achieve
9https://www.arxiv.org
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scholarly esteem via peer-reviewed publications - as discussed above we are particularly
interested in this population. The fact that arXiv data is not subject to peer review filters
could also mean that it reflects better the diversity of views and techniques present in AI
research, admittedly including some off-kilter methods and eccentric studies.
We have downloaded the whole arXiv corpus, comprising 1.84 million articles published
between April of 1986 and August 2020 through arXiv’s API.10 For each article, we obtain
its id, title, date when it was created, its categories (the arXiv categories that the authors
label a article with when they submit it reflecting the scientific discipline or sub-discipline
that it belongs to) and its abstract.
3.2.2 Microsoft Academic Graph (MAG)
One important limitation of the raw arXiv data is that it does not contain information
about the institutional affiliation of an article’s authors, which we need in order to identify
the companies in the data. We obtain this information from Microsoft Academic Graph
(MAG), a large scientometric database collected and enriched by Microsoft Cognitive Ser-
vices [Wang et al., 2020]. We query MAG with the title of the arXiv articles (see Klinger et
al (2018) for additional details about our approach) and extract the institutional affiliation
of each article author as of the time of publication.
3.2.3 Global Research Identifier (GRID)
We fuzzy match the institute names extracted from Microsoft Academic Graph with the
Global Research Identifier (GRID), a public database with detailed metadata about re-
search institutions globally in order to identify their type (Company, Education etc).11 To
do this, we use the same algorithm as Klinger et al. [2018], which combines multiple fuzzy
matching methods to identify GRID institutes that have the same names as institutions
in MAG. This yields just over 1 million articles with institutional information and 2.45
million article-institute pairs. There is a large number of articles with missing institutions
in the early years of arXiv operation (where as we will show AI activity was very limited)
and slight growth of articles without matched institutes in recent years. Visual checks of
the articles lacking institutional information suggests that this is because this information
is not available from MAG or because the research involves less well-known institutes in
some cases based in developing countries.12
10The data has also recently become available as a bulk download from machine learning competition
site Kaggle (https://www.kaggle.com/Cornell-University/arxiv).
11https://www.grid.ac/
12We would expect the exclusion of these institutions from the data to bias our metrics of diversity
downwards.
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One issue with our approach is that it generates duplicate matches for multinational
institutions with presence in multiple locations (for example, Google, a single institute
in MAG, is matched with multiple GRID institutes including Google (United States),
Google (United Kingdom) etc.). To address this we split name strings on parentheses,
retain the organisation name and remove duplicate article-organisations observations. This
means that in the analysis that follows we do not consider how many times a single insti-
tution participates in an article, but simply that it does.
3.3 Methods
Having described our data sources, we focus on the methods that we use to identify AI
articles in our corpus, the topic modelling algorithm that we use to estimate the topical
composition of this corpus based on its abstracts, and the diversity metrics that we estimate
with this information, as well as the sentence embedding approach we use to map the
semantic similarity of organisations participating in AI research.
3.3.1 Identification of AI articles
Recent AI mapping studies have used various methods to identify AI research including
keyword searches and topic modeling of abstracts to identify relevant terms [Cockburn
et al., 2018, Klinger et al., 2018, Stathoulopoulos and Mateos-Garcia, 2019, Frank et al.,
2019, Bianchini et al., 2020]. Here, we are interested in identifying articles using methods
from previous eras in the history of AI that we are less familiar with, and which may
have a weaker presence in the corpus, making them harder to detect using for example
topic models trained in all of arXiv, or all activity in a single arXiv category. We have
identified several arXiv categories that are relevant for us - we refer to them as the ‘core
AI categories’. They are:
1. cs.AI : Computer Science (Artificial Intelligence)
2. cs.NE : Computer Science (Neural and Evolutionary Computing)
3. cs.LG : Computer science (Machine Learning)
4. stat.ML: Statistics (Machine Learning)
In total, there are just under 89,000 unique articles in these categories in the data
(there are 139,000 articles with at least one of the categories but there are significant
overlaps between them, as Figure 1 shows). One risk of removing articles outside of these
categories is that this could lead us to exclude important applications of AI in other fields
of STEM and computing (as the General Purpose Technology - GPT - literature has shown,
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GPTs often see important advances in application sectors that end ‘rolled back’ into the
main trajectory of the technology [Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995]). Previous research
about deep learning has for example shown that arXiv categories such as cs.CV (Computer
Vision) and cs.CL (Computer Language) have been important sites for AI development
and deployment [Klinger et al., 2018]. The challenge is how to systematically incorporate
into our corpus such applications of AI outside core AI categories.
In order to do this, we consider core AI categories to be research areas that specialise
in the development of AI techniques that are then applied in other areas. We would expect
terms related to those AI techniques to be over-represented (salient) in core AI categories,
and present in other articles adopting those AI techniques. We have developed an algorithm
that identifies and expands those terms and then identifies other articles where those terms
appear often. More specifically, we take the following steps:
1. Preprocess text in the corpus of arXiv abstracts: This includes lower-casing, removing
symbols, numbers and commonly used stop-words and tokenising the abstracts, and
combining commonly co-occurring tokens into bi-grams (e.g. ’machine learning’) and
tri-grams (’deep neural network’).
2. Define salient vocabulary in each AI category : We Identify salient terms Si in the sub-
corpora Ci that belong to each of the AI categories i = {cs.AI, cs.NE, cs.LG, stat.ML}:
Given the vocabulary Vi in an AI category, for each n-gram tVi where freqi(t) > 1000
we calculate freqi(t)freq(t) where freq(t) is its frequency in the broader corpus the category
belongs to (e.g. ngram frequencies in cs categories are normalised by ngram frequen-
cies in cs, stats.ML is normalised by ngram frequencies in statistics). We select the
top 20 tokens according to this measure of salience.
3. Expand the salient vocabulary for an AI category : We expand the list of salient terms
Si in each category with a list of similar terms Vi based on a Word2Vec semantic
model trained on the whole corpus [Mikolov et al., 2013]. This allows us to identify
terms that appear in a similar context to salient terms in the AI category.13
4. Identify articles with high frequencies of terms from the expanded salient vocabulary.
Count the occurrences of Xi = Si ∪ Vi in Ci and in Oi = Ci unionsq C (all articles outside
the category). Any article jOi with freqj(Xi) > Ki where Ki is a critical value
based on the mean frequency of Xi in Ci, the mean frequency ¯freq of Xi in Oi, the
standard deviation σ of Xi in Oi and a scaling factor Fi is labelled as belonging to Ei,
an expanded AI corpus from source AI category i (here, we assume that AI articles
outside of an AI core category will have a number of terms related to AI above the
average for non-AI core categories, but lower than the average for AI core categories).
13We select the top 30 terms by similarity to those in Si with a similarity score above 0.5.
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We manually inspect the results with different parametres paying special attention to
Fi, the scaling factor that we use to calculate what frequency of AI category related terms
in articles outside of a corpus indicate that it may belong to an AI category, and choose a
set that reduces the number of false positives (non-AI articles classified as AI) that may
bias upwards our measures of diversity.
Tables 3 and 4 shows, for each core AI category, the scaling factor we use to set our
critical threshold (higher values mean that we require a higher frequency of salient words
in an abstract before including it in our expanded corpus), the frequency of salient terms
inside the corpus Ci and outside Oi, and the expanded salient vocabulary. It shows, for
example, that the salient vocabulary cs.AI and cs.NE often include quite generic terms
(agent, belief, search) which could produce false positives in our search - this is why
we set higher scaling factors for these two categories.14 We note the strong presence of
deep learning related terms in the cs.NE, cs.LG and stat.ML categories and the strong
overlap between the vocabularies of cs.LG, stat.ML, reflecting the fact that articles are
often labelled with both categories. Meanwhile, cs.AI includes terms more often associated
to symbolic approaches to AI that dominated previous eras of AI research.
14As an example, with lower scaling factors the expansion of cs.AI created false positives with economics
research that also uses the language of actors, utilities and preferences.
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AI category i Fi ¯fi(Ci) ¯fi(Oi) Expanded salient vocabulary Xi
cs.AI 2 1.4 0.1 humans, strategic, beliefs, reasoning, reinforcement learning, causal inference, actions,
agents , rules, experts, deep reinforcement learning, online learning, practitioners, artifi-
cial intelligence, multi agent, reward, bayesian, engagement, learners, intention, semantics,
meta learning, policies, decision, knowledge base, agents, learning algorithms, programming
languages, recommendations, agent, decisions, knowledge, learning, cognition, reinforce-
ment, belief, priority, incentives, learner, active learning, decision making, answer, expert,
rewards, exploration, causal, decision tree, planning, policy, perception
cs.NE 2 3 0.4 learning , network architectures, task, functions, recurrent neural network , supervised
learning, unsupervised learning, generative adversarial networks gans, deep reinforcement
learning, deep neural network, semi supervised learning, algorithm, neural network, on-
line learning , convolutional neural network cnn, tasks, convolutional neural networks, deep
convolutional neural networks, optimizations, machine learning algorithms, classification,
multi task learning, bayesian optimization, classification tasks, deep learning, input, deep
neural networks, solutions, training, convolutional neural networks cnns, search, evolution-
ary, architecture, deep convolutional neural network, reinforcement learning, learning al-
gorithms, network architecture, artificial neural networks, recurrent neural networks, deep
neural networks dnns, optimization, networks, machine learning techniques, meta learning,
convolutional neural network, genetic, algorithms, problems, neural networks, dictionary
learning
Table 3: Expansion statistics and vocabulary for cs.AI (Artificial Intelligence) and cs.NE (Neural and Evolutionary
Computing)
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AI category i Fi ¯fi(Ci) ¯fi(Oi) Expanded salient vocabulary Xi
cs.LG 1 1.16 0.03 learning, interpretability, regret, recurrent neural network, supervised learning, unsuper-
vised learning, active learning, generative adversarial networks gans, deep reinforcement
learning, deep neural network, semi supervised learning, sgd, neural network, online learn-
ing, convolutional neural network cnn, learning based, machine learning, convolutional neu-
ral networks, deep convolutional neural networks, machine learning algorithms, dnn, multi
task learning, deep learning, bayesian optimization, transfer learning, classification tasks,
adversarial examples, interpretable, deep neural networks, reward, convolutional neural net-
works cnns, dnns, federated learning, deep convolutional neural network, feature selection,
reinforcement learning, learning algorithms, artificial neural networks, deep neural networks
dnns, recurrent neural networks, machine learning techniques, meta learning, convolutional
neural network, sample complexity, gradient descent, classifiers, neural networks, adversarial
training, classification task, dictionary learning
stat.ML 1 1.4 0.1 semi supervised learning, architectures, reinforcement learning, learning based, learns, ar-
chitecture, convolutional neural network, deep reinforcement learning, network architecture,
trained, reward, convolutional neural network cnn, training, learned, neural networks, em-
beddings, convolutional neural networks, deep learning, deep convolutional neural network,
learners, neural network, tasks, meta learning, deep neural network, labels, gradients, trans-
fer learning, learning algorithms, artificial neural networks, convolutional neural networks
cnns, network trained, learning, deep neural networks dnns, unsupervised learning, multi
task, adversarial training, autoencoder, adversarial, train, deep convolutional neural net-
works, deep neural networks, deep, supervised learning, recurrent neural network, dictionary
learning, multi task learning, learnt, gradient descent, generative adversarial networks gans,
recurrent neural networks
Table 4: Expansion statistics and vocabulary for cs.LG (Machine Learning) and stat.ML (Machine Learning)
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In Figure 1 we show the number of AI articles in different arXiv categories in the
top, and the share of category occurrences for a focal category in the bottom, reflecting
category overlaps (we focus on the top 20 categories by number of occurrences in the AI
corpus). It shows that cs.LG and stat.ML comprise the biggest number of AI articles, and
that there are strong overlaps between them (stat.ML accounts for 40% of other category
occurrences in cs.LG articles). They are followed by cs.AI and cs.CV (computer vision)
and cs.CL (computer language) two application domains that have proven fertile ground
for the deployment of deep learning techniques.
Figure 2 presents number of monthly articles labelled with an AI core category (blue
lines) and expanded from an AI core category (orange lines). It shows strong growth in the
levels of activity in machine learning categories (cs.LG and stat.ML) reflecting the adoption
of machine learning and deep learning in AI research. Growth in cs.AI has been much
slower, probably explained by the fact this category contains AI research based on symbolic
methods that are less widely used today. In the case of cs.NE we see much faster growth
in the number of articles identified using the ‘expanded category’, consistent with the idea
that techniques frequently mentioned in neural and evolutionary computing such as those
related to artificial neural networks and deep learning are often mentioned in other articles
that are not labelled with the cs.NE category, including in particular categories such as
cs.CV and cs.LG. These findings support qualitatively the idea that machine learning and
deep learning techniques have become dominant in AI research, an idea that we explore
further in Subsection 4.2.
3.3.2 Topic modelling
We topic model the thematic composition of AI research in order to calculate various
metrics of diversity that we describe in further detail below. More specifically, we use
topSBM, a hierarchical topic modelling algorithm that uses a network science approach
to estimate topics in the data [Gerlach et al., 2018]. This involves transforming the pre-
processed corpus of n article abstracts into a network where different words are connected
through their co-occurrence in abstracts. This network is decomposed into communities
using the stochastic block model (SBM), a generative model for random graphs [Abbe
et al., 2015].15
This results in a collection of k topics T = {t1, ..., tk} where:
1. Each topic i has a word mix Wi = {wi,1, wi,2, ..., wi,s} representing the probability
that a word belongs to it.
15One advantage of this modeling strategy that we do not exploit in this paper is that it is also possible
to use word co-occurrences to build a network of documents that can be clustered into communities.
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Figure 1: The top panel shows the number of AI articles per arXiv category
(with double counting across bars) and the bottom panel shows the share of
occurrences of other categories in the articles from a category.
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Figure 2: Number of monthly articles labelled in an AI ‘core category‘ and
in an expanded version of a category. All series are smoothed using rolling
averages.
2. Each article l has a topic mix Pl = {pl,1, ...pl,k} representing the probability that a
topic is present in the article.
In the rest of the paper we think of those topic mixes as proxies for the thematic
composition of a paper and, when aggregated in ways that we describe below, as measures
of the thematic composition of particular sub-corpora in the corpus, such as all AI research
in a year, or all AI research in private sector companies or particular organisations.
TopSBM has some important advantages over other topic modelling algorithms applied
in the literature such as Latent Dirichlet Allocation [Blei et al., 2003]. These include the fact
that it generates a hierarchy of topics that can be explored at various levels of resolution,
it makes weaker assumptions about the data-generating processes, and it automatically
identifies the optimal number of topics in a corpus, reducing the need for manual tuning
using hard to interpret tests and heuristics.
When we fit the topic model on our corpus of 115,000 AI articles it yields 750 topics at
the highest level of resolution from which we remove 193 topics that appear in more than
10% of the corpus, and generally contain generic and uninformative collections of terms fre-
quently used in academic research such as ‘using demonstrates previously reported’, ‘recent
previous variety ones demonstrating’ or ‘found initial investigated analyzed investigation’,
and hard to interpret topics comprising two words or less.
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3.3.3 Metrics of diversity
In general, diversity is used to refer to the heterogeneity of the elements of a set in relation
to some class that takes different values, such as for example the species in an ecosystem, the
industries in an economy, or the ethnicity of a population [Page, 2010]. This heterogeneity
can be measured along different dimensions:
1. Variety, capturing the number of classes that are present in the set.
2. Balance, capturing whether the set is dominated by elements from a few classes or
the proportions of different classes in the data are evenly distributed.
3. Disparity, capturing the degree of difference between the classes that are present in
the set.
In general, we expect a set with more classes, with a population more widely distributed
between classes, and with classes that are more different from each other to be more diverse.
In Section 4.3 we take the corpus of AI research in arXiv as our population, and
research ideas and techniques belonging to different topics as the classes. We use these to
calculate three metrics of diversity that put different emphasis on the dimensions above.
They include a:
1. A metric of balance that considers the concentration of AI research on different topics
2. Weitzman’s metric of ecosystem diversity based on overall distance (disparity) be-
tween topics in the corpus [Weitzman, 1992]
3. The Rao-Stirling measure of diversity, that takes into account the balance and dis-
parity of topics in the corpus [Stirling, 2007]
By using these three metrics in parallel, and parametrising them in alternative ways,
we aim to ensure that our findings are robust to various definitions and operationalisations
of diversity, and also to increase their interpretability by considering them from different
perspectives. Tables 5 and 6 respectively define our metrics and the parametres we have
used to operationalise them.
We note some important differences between our metrics that will bear on their in-
terpretation. The balance and Stirling metric are similar in that both of them consider
the distribution of topics in the population, in the case of Rao-Stirling weighted by the
distance between topics that we measure using pairwise distances in the topic distance
matrix, with topics closer within that distance matrix (based on their co-occurrence in
articles) appearing closer to each other. This means that if there are many topics in the
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Metric Definition Operationalisation
Balance Distribution of classes Hirschmann-Herfindahl (HH) index
and Shannon entropy based on the
share of all topics or articles ac-
counted by a topic
Weitzman Sum of distances of the dendrogram
representing a hierarchical clustering
algorithm trained on the data
Distance measures based on topic co-
occurrence in articles
Rao-Stirling Product of shares of classes by their
pairwise distances
Shares based on topic presence in
corpus or article, distances based on
topic co-occurrence in articles
Table 5: Definition and operationalisation of metrics of diversity
Metric Parametre Set 1 Parametre Set 2 Parametre Set 3
Balance HH index of topic distri-
bution over population of
topics present in the cor-
pus
HH index of topic dis-
tribution over articles as-
signed to their top topic
Shannon entropy of topic
distribution over popula-
tion of topics present in
the corpus
Weitzman Cosine distance between
topics
Chebyshev distance be-
tween topics
Jaccard distance be-
tween topics (binarising
on topic presence)
Rao-
Stirling
index
Rao-Stirling index of
topic distribution over
population of topics
present in the corpus
with a threshold above
0.1 and cosine topic
distance
Rao-Stirling index of
topic distribution over
population of topics
present in the corpus
with a threshold above
0.1 and correlation topic
distance
Rao-Stirling index of
topic distribution over
articles assigned to their
top topic and cosine
topic distance
Table 6: Parametre set details by diversity metric
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corpus but they account for a small share of the total, this will limit the corpus’ diversity.
Weitzman diversity, by contrast, does not consider the distribution of topics in the corpus
but only their distance (again based on co-occurrences). This means that it would be
possible to have an extremely concentrated topic distribution with very high diversity if
there is a long tail of minority topics distant from the dominant ones. In a way one could
think of the Weitzman metric of diversity as an indicator of the diversity of classes hosted
in a population (perhaps even its potential to generate future diversity) rather than its
actual manifestation in terms of the importance of these classes. In his economic analysis
of ecological diversity (with an application to cranes), Weitzman complemented an initial
analysis of diversity using this metric with an analysis of the economic value of preserving
diversity that took into account the size of different classes - we do not take that second
step here [Weitzman, 1993].
3.3.4 Sentence embeddings
In the final part of our analysis we will consider the position of organisations participating
in AI research in a semantic space that we map using BERT (Bidirectional Encoder Repre-
sentations and Transformers), a deep learning technique that learns vector representations
of text based on their context [Devlin et al., 2019]. We train this model on the 1.8 mil-
lion abstracts in the arXiv corpus, which yields a 674-dimensional representation of each
article. We calculate the average of these vectors for the articles involving organisations
of interest and visualise their positions using tSNE (t-Stochastic Neighbour Embedding),
a dimensionality reduction technique that projects high-dimensional data in a 2-d or 3-d
space [Maaten and Hinton, 2008].
4 Findings
4.1 Recent evolution of AI research in arXiv
We begin our report of findings by considering the evolution of AI research in arXiv. Is
the widespread perception of an ‘AI boom’ reflected in our data?
Figure 3 shows the monthly number of articles published in AI research and the rest
of the arXiv corpus (top), and the share of the arXiv corpus accounted by AI articles
(bottom). By contrast to non-AI categories, where the number of articles has grown at
a steady pace since the 1990s, growth in AI research has been more recent, and taken
place very rapidly. Remarkably, in the first half of 2020 AI articles comprised 20% of all
publications uploaded to arXiv. 94% of all the AI articles in our corpus were published
after 2012, and 60% after 2018.
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Figure 3: The top panel shows the total number of monthly articles posted
in arXiv in AI and all other categories. The bottom panel shows AI articles as
a share of the arXiv corpus. Both series are smoothed using rolling averages.
Has rapid growth of activity in arXiv has been accompanied by shifts in its topical
composition? To answer this question, we have assigned each topic in our data to the arXiv
category where it has the highest salience.We calculate this analogously to a location or
revealed comparative advantage quotient:
Qi,c =
si,c
si
(1)
Where si,c is the share of topic i in the category c and si is the share of the topic in
the corpus. Qi > 1 indicates that a topic is over-represented in a category.
Table 7 includes some examples of salient topics randomly drawn from various arXiv
categories, illustrating their thematic focus: AI articles in stat.ML refer to statistical tech-
niques such as Gaussian processes and Bayesian inference while cs.CR (Cryptography and
Security) contains topics about software vulnerabilities, privacy, adversarial attacks against
deep learning systems and authentication. cs.CY addresses a range of societally oriented
topics related to health (and more specifically pandemics, including AI research on Covid-
19), education and ethical issues. These results suggest that our topic model captures
relevant information about the thematic composition of different AI sub-fields, and that
our strategy for assigning topics to categories generates accurate results.
In Figure 4 we visualise the evolution of the relative importance of topics associated
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to different arXiv categories as Sc,y share of all the topical activity in the corpus in a given
year t. We calculate this share , for category c, as:
Sc,y =
∑
i=c,lP,y=tBi,l,t∑
iC,lP,y=tBi,l,t
(2)
Where Bi,l = 1 if pi,l > k. k is our threshold for accepting that a topic is present in a
article, which we set to 0.1.
Figure 4: Evolution of topical composition of AI research: each topic has been
labelled with the arXiv category where it has the strongest representation. The
population each year is the sum over categories of all topics occurrences over
0.1 in a article.
Consistent with the narrative of a ‘deep learning boom’, it shows rapid growth in the
importance of topics salient in cs.CV (Computer vision) and cs.CL (Computer Language),
two domains with an abundance of unstructured data where deep learning has contributed
to important advances. Since the mid 2010s, cs.CR (Cryptography and security) has also
gained prominence - this is linked to growing interest in the risk of adversarial attacks, as
well as privacy and cyber-security. Other topical areas that have seen growth include cs.CY
(Computer and Society), with research about AI applications in health, its educational as-
pects and ethical implications, cs.IR (information retrieval), linked to the development of
search engines and recommendation system, an important AI application area for technol-
ogy companies, and cs.RO (robotics). At the same time, we see a decline in the relative
importance of topics related to cs.AI, which tend to be more focused on symbolic tech-
niques and slight decline (specially since the mid 2010s) of stat.ML (statistical machine
learning) topics involving various machine learning techniques outside of deep learning.
Interestingly cs.NE has seen a decline since the 2010s despite the increasing popular-
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ity of ‘neural computing’ techniques. One explanation for this result is that many deep
learning-related techniques have been developed in application domains such as computer
vision and computer language, reflecting the idea that GPT in application sectors can be as
important as those that take place in the GPT development sector, as well as the fact that
practical applications of deep learning have progressed faster than theoretical analyses.
Figure 4 also suggests qualitatively that the thematic diversity of AI research has
increased over time, with less concentration of topical activity in a small number of cat-
egories. The figure tells us little, however, about the thematic composition of AI at the
level of individual topics, or about the extent to which the topics being pursued have high
disparity, that is, are different from each other. We will come back to these questions in
Section 4.3. Before doing this, we will consider the levels of private sector participation in
AI research.
4.2 Private sector participation in AI research
As we discussed in Section 4.2, private sector companies - and in particular ‘tech’ companies
- have played an important role in recent AI breakthroughs. To which extent is this
phenomenon visible in our data?
Figure 5 compares the share of participations of various organisation types in AI
research with the situation in other research areas. More specifically, this is calculated
as the total number of articles involving an organisation types normalised by the number
of articles involving all organisations. It shows, perhaps unsurprisingly, that academic
institutions (Education) are the most active in the corpus. We also find strong evidence
for the idea that the private sector is relatively active in AI research: private companies
account for around 10% of all research participations, a share ten times higher than their
participation in arXiv outside of AI. By contrast, Government, nonprofit and Facilities are
less active in AI research compared to their shares of participation in the wider corpus.
Figure 6 shows the evolution in the shares of research participations by different or-
ganisation types excluding academic institutions. The right panel shows that private sector
participation in AI research is a recent phenomenon and that it has almost doubled in the
last decade. Government institutions used to play a more important role in AI research
before 2010, although there were very low volumes of AI research then. Healthcare and
nonprofit participation in AI research has remained stable in recent years, and below the
levels we see outside AI research (presented in the left panel).
Figure 7 shows levels of AI activity involving the 15 companies most active in the
corpus. Our results confirm the idea that technology and internet companies are actively
involved in AI research: the top 5 companies in our list are US technology companies -
Google, Microsoft, IBM, Facebook and Amazon. While Google, Microsoft and IBM have
been active in AI research since the early 2000s, Amazon and Facebook only started gaining
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Category Examples
cs.AI artificial intelligence artificial computer intelligence life...
machine machines pattern recognition steady turing machine...
describe elements description forms element...
proof proofs theorems automated reasoning conjectures...
cs.NE capacity coefficients coefficient analytically permutation...
development engineering prototype creation organization...
describing chapter ais dca som...
building paper presents modelling built integration...
cs.LG emph algorithmic line satisfy arising...
arms arm thompson sampling bandit bandits...
loss losses cross entropy cross entropy loss sharpness...
memory stored store storing memories...
stat.ML gaussian process gaussian processes gps inducing gaussian process regres...
independent mean dependent fraction moment...
signal signals signal processing snr complex valued...
bayesian likelihood posterior bayesian inference posterior distribution...
cs.CV style art sketch styles sketches...
source domain adaptation target domain cross domain unsupervised domain.˙.
tracking tracker speaker verification front end speaker recognition...
spectral spectra laplacian band bands...
cs.CL rare drug medicine biomedical drugs...
natural language meaning symbolic descriptions compositional...
sequence sequences hmm hidden markov variable length...
vector vectors proximity inner product dot product...
cs.CR security iot secure protection vulnerabilities...
privacy private differential privacy differentially private privacy prese...
adversarial adversarial examples adversarial training adversarial attacks.˙.
authentication fingerprints biometric fingerprint pain...
cs.IR feature selection classification regression elm linear discriminant analy...
items recommendation recommendations item recommender systems...
emotion emotions emotional stress emotion recognition...
retrieval hashing image retrieval triplet triplet loss...
cs.CY infection pandemic epidemic infected virus...
program programs programming induction syntax...
students course education educational university...
law society legal ethical stakeholders...
Table 7: Random salient topics in selected arXiv categories
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Figure 5: Level of participation of different organisation types in AI research
compared to the wider arXiv corpus. Participation is measured as the share of
organisation type participation (number of articles) normalised by all research
participations
Figure 6: Evolution of participation of different organisation types outside of
AI research (left) and in AI research (right). The scale in the Y axis is different
between both panels. Series are smoothed using rolling averages.
prominence since the mid 2010s. We note the presence of several Chinese internet com-
panies (Tencent, Alibaba and Baidu) in our data, as well as two European manufacturing
businesses (Bosch and Siemens) and semiconductor manufacturers Intel and Nvidia.16
When we focus on the share of AI research involving these companies in the bottom
panel of Figure 7, we find, perhaps surprisingly, that their share of AI activity has declined
since the mid 2000s, when almost 60% of AI articles involved them, with particularly strong
levels of participation by Microsoft, IBM, Google and Intel. It is worth noting that the
overall levels of AI research were very low at that point (see top panel). If we consider more
recent years when the levels of AI research in arXiv started increasing, we find an initial
increase in the share of AI research involving these companies, reaching around 25% of
16We also note that the Google category includes the research activities of DeepMind, an Alphabet
subsidiary that is classified inside Google by Microsoft Academic Graph.
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Figure 7: The top panel presents the evolution in the number of AI articles
involving the top 15 companies by total levels of activity in the AI arXiv corpus.
The bottom panel presents the evolution of the share of AI articles involving
those same companies. Both series are smoothed using rolling averages.
all AI research between 2015 and 2019. Since 2019 this share has been declining although
this is driven by rapid growth in the volume of AI research in wider arXiv rather than a
decline in AI publication levels by these companies. Despite this, in the first months of
2020, almost two in ten AI research articles in arXiv involved one of these private sector
companies.
4.3 Evolution of thematic diversity
In the rest of the paper we focus on the evolution of thematic diversity in AI research,
and on comparing the thematic diversity of AI research involving private sector companies
with the rest of the corpus.
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Figure 8 presents the evolution of thematic diversity in AI research based on our three
diversity metrics and three parametre sets. In rough terms, all our operationalisations of
diversity present a similar picture of the evolution of thematic diversity of AI research,
with an initial increase in diversity as the volume of AI research increased followed by
stabilisation / stagnation and perhaps even a slight decline in recent years.
Figure 8: Evolution of thematic diversity in AI research. Each panel presents
the evolution of diversity according to one of our metrics (balance, Weitzman
and Rao-Stirling) and different parametre sets. We have calculated the z-score
in each of our time series to make them comparable across parametre sets that
yield different absolute values.
The balance metric (which focuses on the distribution of activity over topics) and the
Rao-Stirling metric (which weights balance by the distance between topics) present very
similar trends, with a strong increase of diversity after 2012 followed by stabilisation from
2017 onwards. The Weitzman metric, which considers the total distance between topics in
the corpus but not their distribution is smoother, and its temporal sequence is different,
with earlier growth and stabilisation of diversity or (in the case of parametre set 1 where we
calculate topic distance using the Chebyshev metric) a recent increase of diversity following
32
by a drop in 2020.17.
Figure 9 explores further the evolution of topic balance and disparity in the AI corpus.
The top panel shows the evolution of the share of all topic occurrences accounted for by
the most popular topics in a year (based on their number of occurrences in the corpus) for
different thresholds of popularity. We see that the share of topic occurrences accounted for
by the most important topics declined until around 2017, when it stabilised and started
increasing. This suggests that in recent years AI research has began concentrating themat-
ically in a smaller number of popular topics. The lower panel shows the evolution of the
mean of the eigenvector centrality in a topic co-occurrence network for the most popular
topics in different years - in other words, the mean distance of popular topics from other
popular topics in the network.18 The slight increases in the series suggest a decline in the
distance between popular topics which would be expected to lower the disparity of the
corpus and its thematic diversity.
We dig deeper into the evolution of the distance between AI topics by comparing topic
co-occurrence networks between 2013-2016 and 2019-2020. In these networks, each node is
a topic and the edges between them are the number of times they co-occur in articles.19. We
display the resulting networks in Figure 10, where in order to simplify the visualisation we
filter the co-occurrence network with a maximum spanning tree algorithm that preserves
those edges with the largest weights that return a maximally connected network. The size
of a node represent the topic’s number of occurrences in the period, and its colour the arXiv
category where the topic is most salient (calculated using the approach that we outlined
in sub-section 4.2). Those topics that are not salient in any of the key categories in the
legend are transparent.
The networks illustrate the important thematic transition undertaken by AI research
in recent years. The 2013-2016 network displayed in the top panel is dominated by topics
related to cs.AI and stat.ML. The 2019-2020 network in the bottom panel is more densely
connected, and deep learning-related categories such as cs.CV, cs.CL and cs.CR appear
more prominently, in several cases forming communities of frequently co-occurring topics.
The statistics of network connectivity and distance presented in table 8 are consistent
with the idea that the distance between topics in the topic co-occurrence network have
decreased over time in a way that could reduce disparity and the stabilisation or decline of
diversity visible in Figure 8: the older network had more disconnected components, and,
in its largest connected component, a longer diameter (maximum distance between nodes),
and a larger average path length (average number of steps that have to be taken to reach
17This decline may be linked to the fact that our 2020 corpus does not include a full year of activity,
reducing the number of topics present in the topic and therefore the sum of distances between them which
is used to calculate the Weitzman metric)
18Eigenvector centrality is defined as the centrality of a node (its number of connections) weighted by
the eigenvector centrality of the nodes it is connected with.
19We consider that a topic occurs in an article if its weight on the article is above 0.1
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Figure 9: The top panel presents the share of topic occurrences accounted
by the most important topics at different levels of the distribution. The bot-
tom panel presents the mean eigenvector centrality in the topic co-occurrence
network for topics at different levels of the corpus occurrence distribution.
all other nodes in the network from a given node).
4.4 Diversity and organisation types
The results presented above suggest that thematic diversity in AI research has stagnated in
recent years. One potential mechanism for this kind of decline put forward in the directed
technological change literature (and consistent with some of recent trends in AI research
outlined in subsection 4.2) is the presence of organisations with strong incentives to focus
on those technologies that perform better presently at the expense of alternatives that
would preserve technological diversity. We would expect those incentives to be stronger in
the private sector than in academia and the public sector. Here we explore this question
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Figure 10: Topic co-occurrence graphs for 2013-2016 (top panel) and 2019-
2020 (bottom panel). Each graph is the maximum spanning graph of the
network of topic co-occurrences in articles published in the year above a min-
imum threshold of 0.1. The size of a node represents the number of instances
a topic occurs in the topic and its colour the arXiv category where it is most
salient.
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Network Number of components Average Path Length Diameter
Network 2013-2016 13 5.823 14
Network 2019-2020 10 5.157 12
Table 8: Network statistics for topic co-occurrence networks including num-
ber of (disconnected) components in the network, average path length between
nodes in the largest component of the network and diameter (maximum dis-
tance between nodes in the largest connected component).
empirically.
We begin by comparing thematic diversity in the corpus of AI research involving the
private sector and the rest of the corpus, after which we perform a multivariate analysis of
drivers of thematic diversity at the organisation level and map AI research organisations in
a semantic space whose structure could shed some light on the state and recent evolution
of thematic diversity in AI research. We conclude by studying the AI research topics that
private sector companies tend to specialise on.
4.4.1 Field-level comparison
Figure 11 compares thematic diversity in the corpus of AI research involving private sector
companies and the rest of the corpus. We seek to account for potential confounders between
these variables by only including in the comparison articles published after 2015. We find
that the levels of thematic diversity in research private sector organisations is lower than
the levels of thematic diversity in the rest of the corpus for all metrics and parametre
sets. This is consistent with the idea that the private sector has a narrower thematic focus
than research in other domains (and most specifically academia, where the majority of AI
research still takes place).
Another potential confounder in the relation between thematic diversity and organi-
sation type is the size of the corpora that we are comparing: if thematic diversity tends
to be lower in smaller corpora and the corpus of private sector AI research activity is
smaller than the academic corpus (as mentioned before, the top companies in AI research
accounted for around 18% of all articles in 2020), then this could explain the differences
highlighted above. To account for this, we extract random samples of the same size (1000
articles) from each of our sub-corpora (research involving private sector and non private
sector organisations) and use them to calculate thematic diversity with our three metrics
and parametre sets. Figure 12 compares the mean scores for our metrics and parametre
sets with 30 random sample draws per metric / parametre set and sub-corpus. We still find
that thematic diversity in AI research is consistently lower for all metrics and parametre
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Figure 11: Thematic diversity in AI research after 2015 and involving /
excluding private sector companies according to different metrics of diversity
and parametre sets. The scale in the Y axis is different across charts
sets.
4.4.2 Modelling thematic diversity at the organisation level
Having compared the thematic diversity of AI research involving and excluding private
sector organisations at the field level, here we explore the drivers of thematic diversity
at the organisational level using a linear regression framework. This allows us to start
building a more finely grained understanding of the micro-dynamics of field level diversity,
and to account for heterogeneity inside organisation types.
Our model setup is thus:
di,m,p,y = α+ β1is compi + β2log(article ni,y) + β3y + i (3)
Where di,m,p,y is thematic diversity in organisation i according to metric m and
parametre set p in year y. is comp is a dummy capturing whether i is a company or not,
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Figure 12: Thematic diversity in AI research after 2015 and involving /
excluding private sector companies according to different metrics of diversity
and parametre sets, calculated in samples of 1000 articles drawn from each
sub-corpora, with 30 runs per comparison. The scale in the Y axis is different
across charts
and log(article ni,y) is the number of articles published by the organisation in y (logged).
We include year fixed effects and, in one of the specification of the model, organisation
fixed effects to capture unobservable sources of heterogeneity between organisations.
We are specially interested in the coefficients for two parametres in the model:
1. β1: This is the estimate of the link between an organisation type and its thematic di-
versity after we control for other important factors, in particular its levels of research
activity, which could impact independently on its thematic diversity.
2. β3: This estimate informs us about whether organisation-level thematic diversity
in AI research has declined over time after we control for other factors, providing
additional evidence about the recent evolution of thematic diversity in AI research.
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We focus our analysis on 118 organisations with at least 100 AI publications in the
data, and in the last three years (2018,2019 and 2020).
Before presenting our results, we should highlight that the analysis we present here
is not aimed at estimating causal effects - it does not even include a clear treatment as
such - but to generate additional evidence about the evolution of diversity and its link with
organisation types. Section 5 considers next steps for the research aimed at identifying
causal drivers of diversity in AI research.
Table 9 presents our regression results. We overview them in turn.
1. The coefficient β1 is negative for balance and Rao-Stirling metrics of diversity but
it becomes positive when we introduce organisation fixed effects, suggesting hetero-
geneity between organisations. We explore the interpretation of this result in further
detail below by looking at the fixed effects of particular organisations in the data.
The sign of the coefficients is reversed for the Weitzman metric of diversity: it is pos-
itive without fixed effects, but it turns negative in the fixed effects specification. This
point at important differences between the interpretation of the Weitzman indicator
and the other metrics of diversity highlighted in Section 3.
2. In all cases, β2, the coefficient for the link between number of articles and diversity
metrics is positive, consistent with the idea that broader corpora and larger organi-
sations are, other things equal, able to maintain more thematically diverse research
profiles.
3. The coefficient β3 for the link between year and thematic diversity is consistently
negative for the balance and Rao-Stirling metrics in all their parametrisations and
specification, suggesting a decline in organisational thematic diversity over time. The
coefficient for Weitzman diversity is positive, although as we noted before this could
be interpreted as evidence for the potential in AI research to generate diversity rather
than its manifestation in reality.
Figure 13 presents the coefficients for the organisation fixed effects on the Rao-Stirling
diversity metric with parametre set 2 in the left panel, and number of articles involving
the organisation in the right panel.20 Our fixed effects capture an organisation’s diversity
compared to the rest of the population after adjusting for its logged publication levels,
publication year and its organisational status (whether it is a company or not). It shows
that technology companies such as Google and Microsoft tend to be thematically narrower
after controlling for those variables. They are followed in adjusted thematic narrowness
by some of the largest and most prestigious US institutions in AI research (MIT, Carnegie
20As shown throughout, the Rao-Stirling diversity results are very similar for different parametre sets,
and to the balance metrics.
39
1. Balance 0 0 1 1 2 2
Company index -0.41*** 0.51* -0.19* 0.88* -0.37*** 0.12*
(-3.86) (1.04) (-1.58) (1.45) (-4.48) (0.32)
Number of articles (log) 1.11*** 1.47*** 1.0*** 1.39*** 1.22*** 1.51***
(25.69) (18.53) (19.7) (14.05) (35.43) (24.96)
Year -0.05* -0.06** -0.06* -0.07** -0.03* -0.03*
(-1.41) (-2.12) (-1.43) (-2.02) (-0.98) (-1.6)
R2 0.65 0.88 0.53 0.81 0.78 0.93
N 354 354 354 354 354 354
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
2. Weitzman 1 1 2 2 3 3
Company index 0.01* -0.34* 0.01* -0.33* 0.08* -0.16*
(0.33) (-1.75) (0.34) (-1.71) (1.3) (-0.68)
Number of articles (log) 1.32*** 1.06*** 1.32*** 1.06*** 1.28*** 0.98***
(73.19) (33.76) (72.89) (33.73) (51.69) (25.06)
Year 0.02* 0.02** 0.02* 0.02** 0.01* 0.02*
(1.15) (2.01) (1.13) (1.98) (0.55) (1.2)
R2 0.94 0.98 0.94 0.98 0.89 0.97
N 354 354 354 354 354 354
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
3. Rao-Stirling 1 1 2 2 3 3
Company index -0.11* 0.48* -0.1* 0.46* -0.3** 0.69*
(-0.81) (0.63) (-0.72) (0.61) (-2.45) (1.12)
Number of articles (log) 0.91*** 1.27*** 0.91*** 1.28*** 0.99*** 1.35***
(16.5) (10.25) (16.58) (10.37) (19.41) (13.44)
Year -0.04* -0.04* -0.03* -0.04* -0.06* -0.06*
(-0.75) (-0.95) (-0.71) (-0.92) (-1.3) (-1.82)
R2 0.44 0.7 0.44 0.71 0.52 0.81
N 354 354 354 354 354 354
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Table 9: Regression results for various diversity metrics (Balance in top table,
Weitzman in middle table, Rao-Stirling in bottom table) and parametre sets
(see columns). t-values in parentheses. *** p ¡ 0.01, ** p ¡ 0.05, * p ¡ 0.1.
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Mellon, University of California Berkeley and Stanford) and other tech companies in the
US and China. Although we advise caution in the interpretation of these results (the wide
confidence intervals mean that most of the results are not statistically significant), these
estimates suggest that technology companies in particular tend to be more thematically
narrow in their AI research profiles, and that the same is true for some of the most presti-
gious and active US universities. Smaller academic institutions in other countries tend to
have higher levels of diversity, suggesting that they could play an important role preserving
diversity in AI research.
4.4.3 The thematic profile of private sector companies in AI research
Our analysis above suggests that some private sector companies (in particular large technol-
ogy companies that have played a leading role in key breakthroughs of modern AI research)
tend to be thematically narrower than other institutions in the corpus. But what topics
do private sector focus on specifically?
To answer this question, we have compared the share of AI articles involving pri-
vate sector institutions with a topic with the share of AI articles that do not involve
private sector institutions. This is a proxy for the levels of relative specialisation (or over-
representation) of private sector AI research in particular topics. We present the results in
Figure 14, and some notable examples in Table 7.
We find that private sector companies tend to be more specialised in arXiv categories
such as cs.CL (Computer Language), cs.DC (Distributed and parallel computing), cs.IR
(information retrieval) and cs.CV (computer vision). They are less focused on cs.AI (Ar-
tificial Intelligence concentrating on symbolic techniques), cs.NE (Neural and evolutionary
computing), Stat:ML (statistical machine learning) and cs.CY (Computers and Society).
This supports the idea that private sector companies focus on AI applications enabled
by deep learning and in research to advance the computational infrastructure required by
large-scale, safe deep learning research (this result is consistent with [Ahmed and Wahed,
2020]). They are less focused on AI techniques outside of deep learning, and on wider AI
application and implications.
We illustrate these differences by considering some notable topics. As table 10 shows,
private sector AI research specialises in topics related to recommendation systems and
advertising (keys 2 and 3), and research in areas that complements deep learning, such
as graphical processing unit optimisation (key 1) or the analysis of adversarial examples
that could threaten the performance of deep learning systems. In less applied categories
such as cs.AI or cs.NE, private sector companies focus on techniques allied to the deep
learning design such as reinforcement learning or recurrent neural networks. We also note
that companies are also over-represented in a topic that mentions code and GitHub (a
popular code sharing repository), suggesting that private sector researchers are more likely
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Figure 13: The right panel shows fixed effects and confidence intervals for the
coefficient of top organisations in the Rao-Stirling specification with parametre
set 2. The left bar shows the number of AI publications by organisations in the
period. The colour of the bar shows the organisation type according to GRID.
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Figure 14: Each scatter presents, for each arXiv category, the share of AI
research involving private sector organisations (orange point) and public sector
organisations (blue point) with a topic. Topics are assigned to arXiv categories
following the approach presented in subsection 4.2, and sorted by their overall
importance in the category. The categories are sorted from left to right and
top to bottom based on the mean difference of shares of activity in private
sector AI research and public sector AI research for all topics in the category.
We have labelled with red numbers some notable topics (see legend in table 7)
to release open source code for others to adopt and build on, encouraging the dissemination
of the techniques that they develop.
When we consider examples of the topics that academic researchers tend to focus on,
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we find that they are relatively specialised in AI applications in health, including analyses
of MRI scans (key 4), healthcare systems (key 12) and infections and pandemics (key 14),
as well as research that considers the ethical and legal implications of AI.
4.4.4 Semantic map of AI research organisations
We conclude our report of results by presenting a semantic map of organisations active in
AI research. In order to produce these maps, we have characterised the research profiles
of these organisations through the sentence embeddings (vector representations) of the
articles that they have participated on, and projected these profiles on a two-dimensional
space using t-SNE, a dimensionality reduction technique.
Figure 15 shows three t-SNE plots where the points are organisations, their size are
the number of AI publications in 2019 and 2020, their color their organisation type and
their coordinates their position in semantic space. In these maps, proximity between
points suggests similarity (although we note that distances should be interpreted locally
rather than globally [Wattenberg et al., 2016]). Each of the maps progressively ‘zooms
out’ from the largest organisations to encompass a wider population with lower levels of AI
activity. We annotate the figure with dashed circles highlighting three qualitative clusters
of organisations with semantically similar research profiles.
1. The blue dashed cluster includes large technology companies such as Google, Mi-
crosoft, Facebook and Amazon.
2. The green cluster includes various elite US research institutions such as MIT, Stanford
University, Carnegie Mellon as well as prestigious universities outside of the US such
as the University of Toronto and Oxford University.
3. The black cluster includes various Chinese universities such as Tsinghua University,
Zheijang University and Peking University, as well as the Chinese Academy of Sci-
ences and Chinese technology companies such as Tencent and Alibaba.
Our maps seem to capture meaningful patterns in the data. They also show that larger
organisations (those that were already present in the initial ‘zoomed in’ plot) tend to be
semantically clustered as we broaden our focus, while smaller institutions are scattered
more widely across the map. This is consistent with our previous observation that smaller
research institutions that are perhaps less involved in collaborations with private sector
companies and publication races that induce institutional isomorphism in the field could
help preserve thematic diversity in AI research. Speculatively, they also suggest that
geopolitically-driven AI races like those taking place between China and the US could
enhance thematic diversity by encouraging organisations in different countries to advance
alternative AI trajectories.
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Key Topic label arXiv category Specialised
1 optimizations gpu gpus tensorflow cpu cs.DC Company
2 items recommendation recommendations item
recommender systems
cs.IR Company
3 conversion revenue ads click advertising cs.IR Company
4 registration medical imaging mri scans vol-
umes
cs.CV Academia
5 adversarial adversarial examples adversarial
training adversarial attacks adversarial per-
turbations
cs.CR Company
6 security iot secure protection vulnerabilities cs.CR Academia
7 code source code bugs apis github cs.SE Company
8 driving vehicle vehicles autonomous driving
road
cs.RO Academia
9 reinforcement learning deep reinforcement
learning model free q learning reinforcement
learning algorithms
cs.AI Company
10 recurrent lstm rnn recurrent neural networks
rnns
cs.NE Company
11 swarm pso abc particle swarm optimization
metaheuristic
cs.NE Academia
12 clinical patients medical patient healthcare cs.CY Academia
13 law society legal ethical stakeholders cs.CY Academia
14 infection pandemic epidemic infected virus cs.CY Academia
Table 10: Legend for topics in Figure 14. The key is the key for the topic in
that figure, the topic label its name, the arXiv category is the category where
the topic is most salient, and specialised shows whether companies or academic
institutions are most specialised in the topic.45
Figure 15: tSNE visualisations of AI research organisations based on their
research profiles. Each of the maps shows an expanding subset of the organisa-
tions active in AI research based on their number of articles in 2019 and 2020
(top left shows the top 100 organisations, top right the top 500 and bottom
left the top 1000). The size of the nodes represents the number of articles
published by the institutions in that period, and the color their organisation
type based on the GRID classification. We annotate three notable clusters
of organisations with dashed circles. They are US technology companies (in
blue), large US universities (green) and Chinese universities and technology
companies (in black).
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5 Conclusion
5.1 Discussion of results
We have studied the thematic diversity of AI research in the arXiv pre-print corpus using a
variety of metrics, parametre sets and approaches. We do this motivated by the literature
on directed technological change, which has identified a set of processes that may lead
to a loss of diversity in a technology landscape and its dominance by technologies that
are (or are eventually found to be) inferior. Recent trends in AI research that we also
document suggest the presence of such trends as powerful deep learning systems build
momentum despite some misgivings about their limitations, the field becomes increasingly
dominated by private sector companies focused on technologies that complement their
assets and capabilities, and processes of institutional isomorphism lead to a convergence in
the behaviours and profiles of organisations in the field.
Our findings are broadly consistent with the idea of a narrowing of AI research: af-
ter an initial period where thematic diversity in AI research increased as deep learning
techniques emerged and started to be deployed in a variety of settings, thematic diversity
has stabilised and perhaps even started to decline in recent years. This process involves
greater concentration of research activity in popular research techniques (topics) and a
decline in the disparity of these techniques. This descriptive result is supported by our
multivariate analysis, where several model specifications show that the thematic diversity
of the organisations most active in AI research has declined in recent years.
Our comparison of the thematic diversity of private sector organisations with other
participants in AI research suggests that the former are more narrowly focused on a special-
ist set of techniques, although this result appears to be driven by a small number of prolific
technology companies specialised in application domains related to the digital economy
such as computer language, computer vision and information retrieval (including search
engines, recommendation systems and ad-targeting). These companies also specialise in
research topics about computational infrastructures to scale up deep learning systems and
cutting-edge techniques such as reinforcement learning. Private sector companies pay less
attention to health applications of AI and ethical and legal considerations.
We also find some evidence of institutional isomorphism in the field: elite universities
in the US have comparatively narrow research profiles, and are clustered closely in our
semantic map of AI research. Smaller academic institutions including many outside of the
USA are more widely scattered across this semantic map, suggesting that they might be
helping to preserve thematic diversity in AI research.
Our results are not consistent across all metrics. More specifically, the Weitzman
metric of diversity based on disparity within AI corpora suggests that organisational the-
matic diversity has grown in recent years. We interpret this result as an artifact of the
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construction of this metric, which does not take into account the balance of topics within
a corpus and therefore ignores the fact that a minimum level of activity within a research
topic may be required for it to be sustainable and able to contribute to future develop-
ments in the field. Imitating Weitzman’s strategy for the economic valuation of ecological
diversity with an analysis that considers the costs and benefits of preserving diversity in AI
research taking into account current levels of activity in different topics and the ‘minimum
viable threshold’ below which a research topic becomes unsustainable would be a natural
continuation for the work we have presented here [Weitzman, 1993].
5.2 Limitations and issues for further research
Our analysis does not consider the complex mechanisms underpinning the co-evolution of
organisations and technologies in AI research: for example, we tacitly assume that the
prominence of private sector companies in AI research is shaping the trajectory of the
field. This assumption needs to be tested empirically with a strong focus on identifying
the mechanisms through which this ‘shaping’ takes place. For example:
1. Have key contributions by researchers in the private sector provided building blocks
for subsequent work by others in the field? Did they foreclose alternative AI trajec-
tories?
2. To which extent are labour flows and collaborations between academia and industry
driving the processes of institutional isomorphism and narrowing of technological
trajectories that we allude to in this paper?
3. How are competitive dynamics in academia - including races to publish and present
research in high profile conferences - independently contributing to a narrowing of
AI research?
4. What has been the impact of the recent influx of public funding in AI research, in
some cases with the explicit goal of ‘winning the AI race’ impacted on the dynamics
that we have described here?
5. What are the links between lack of socio-demographic diversity in the AI research
workforce that has been evidenced elsewhere and a thematic narrowing (potentially
leading to discriminatory and unfair outcomes) of AI research?
Micro-analyses of the behaviours of individual researchers, organisations and communities
and their interconnections could shed light on these questions, with important implications
for research funders who may want to preserve thematic diversity in AI research.
This begs another important question: throughout our analysis we have assumed that
there is an intrinsic value in technological / thematic diversity. This is motivated by the
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history of AI, where previous efforts to preserve technological diversity provided the foun-
dation for subsequent advances (including the back-propagation algorithm which, as our
epigraph notes, for decades was ‘cool math that didn’t accomplish anything’ but eventually
provided a key building block for the deep learning revolution), and by concerns about im-
portant limitations in the deep learning trajectory that dominates the AI landscape today.
At the same time, much thematic diversity in AI research may be dysfunctional, reflect-
ing for example scholarly inertia and lack of skills or infrastructure preventing academic
researchers from adopting state-of-the-art techniques.
Future research should set out to quantify the value of thematic diversity in the terms
that we have discussed in the paper: how does the work of organisations with more diverse
research profiles contribute to advances in the field, for example by providing components
for combinatorial AI innovations? Recent years have seen a growing number of examples
where deep learning methods are combined with methods from other AI traditions such as
random forests, bayesian inference and causal inference [Miller et al., 2017, Kendall and
Gal, 2017]. To which extent are these novel combinations helping overcome some of the
limitations of the dominant AI design, and enabling the development of AI applications
in novel domains that are poorly served by state-of-the-art commercial technologies? This
focus on evidencing the benefits of technological diversity could be complemented with
analyses of the downsides of homogeneity in terms of diminishing returns in the deep
learning trajectory and deployment failures that could have been avoided with a more
diverse mix of techniques.
Finally, our analysis is based on a single data source about research pre-prints that
we analyse using experimental semantic methods. Going forward it will be important to
expand this analysis using other data sources capturing AI development and deployment
including peer-reviewed publications, patents, open source software development and busi-
ness development and diffusion activities. In addition to triangulating our findings, such
extensions would help to identify bottlenecks in the deployment of AI systems and opportu-
nities to overcome them with other methods from thematically diverse AI corpora. Further
analyses of thematic diversity in AI using alternative metrics and operationalisations and
measurement approaches such as for example citation patterns would help validate the
results we have presented here. To enable such analyses, expansions and validations, we
plan to release all the code that we have used in our analysis together with the underlying
data.21
5.3 Policy implications
This paper has presented a theoretical, qualitative and quantitative rationale for policies to
preserve thematic diversity in AI research. Although we currently lack sufficient evidence
21See here for additional information: https://github.com/nestauk/ai diversity research
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about mechanisms to confidently recommend specific interventions with that goal, we note
some available options highlighted elsewhere in the literature and in some cases already
starting to be implemented in practice such as:
• Increasing diversity in the backgrounds and disciplines of the individuals and groups
involved in AI research
• Reducing the brain drain of academic researchers from academia to industry
• Ensuring that academic researchers have sufficient computational resources to under-
take their work independently from the private sector
• Modifying incentive structures in academia to reduce the intensity of research races
• Developing funding models and grant assessment strategies that help diversify the
set of ideas that are supported
• Using horizon scanning methods to develop funding agendas that take into account
counterfactual trajectories in AI research
• Funding mission-oriented work to deploy AI systems in domains that may require
new techniques and combinations of techniques
• Developing new benchmarks of AI system performance that capture the strengths of
alternative designs
We conclude by highlighting three important challenges standing on the way of these
policies.
First, there is an incentive problem: policymakers face a similar dilemma to AI re-
searchers: they have incentives to support those AI technologies with the greatest present
potential because they are more likely to produce economic impacts and help develop com-
petitive AI industries. The notion of an AI global race provides an additional geopolitical
rationale to focus on today’s state-of-the-art technologies at the expense of investments in
technological diversity that may yield benefits in the future or be captured by other organ-
isations or countries. Such externalities could be internalised if policymakers in different
countries coordinated their activities, but the perception of a global AI race will hinder
such coordination.
Second, there is an information problem: even if they overcame the incentive problem,
policymakers would need to develop strategies to identify suitable research lines that could
help preserve thematic diversity in AI. Here, they face an information asymmetry with
researchers and businesses that have private information about the quality of their research
(including its uniqueness and how it could help to diversify AI research) and are thus able
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to behave opportunistically to secure funding. The fact that strategies to preserve thematic
diversity will tend to focus on ideas and communities outside of the research mainstream
that are harder to assess reduces their success prospects, and increases the likelihood of
wasting resources and distorting research efforts in unproductive directions.
Third, there is a scale problem: most public research budgets are small compared to the
R&D budgets of the private sector and in particular large technology companies. Targeted
efforts to steer the trajectory of AI research and increase its diversity are unlikely to have
significant impacts unless they are complemented by allied policies to change technology
development and adoption in the private sector. This could include regulatory interventions
that penalise algorithmic failures, tax the environmental costs of AI systems and restrict
heavy usage of personal data, thus giving the private sector incentives to develop and adopt
alternative techniques. Another option would be to increase the supply and diversity of AI
talent to bolster the ‘public interest AI sphere‘ and increase the demographic diversity of
the AI workforce in industry, contributing indirectly to a diversification in the technological
trajectories that are explored.
Recent trends in AI research including the evidence that we have provided suggest
that research funders and other stakeholders in the AI policy ecosystem need to look for
ways to overcome these challenges and mitigate the risk of a decline in AI’s technological
diversity, preserving spaces for public interest AI R&D, and patiently investing in runner-
up AI techniques that might under-perform today but could play an important role in
future AI breakthroughs. We hope that the methods and metrics that we have developed
in this paper can play a part in informing this policy effort.
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